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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thurgood Marshall sits as an Associate Justice on the United 
States Supreme Court, the only black person ever to do so. Before tak­
ing that office he served as the Solicitor General of the United States 
and as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. In these offices he has been called upon to bring his powers of 
judgment to bear on a multitude of matters concerning this Nation's 
Constitution.1 His views on the Constitution, therefore, cannot be easily 
* Assistant Professor, Louisiana State University Law Center; B.A. 1973, J.D. 1977, Yale Uni­
versity. The Author wishes to thank several colleagues at L ouisiana State University and other 
institutions who have read and commented on drafts of this Article: William B. Allen, Paul R. 
Baier, John S. Baker, Joseph T. Bockrath, James W. Bowers, Robert J. Cottrol, John M. Devlin, 
Paul Finkelman, Kenneth M. Murchison, Benjamin M. Shieber, and Eulis Simien, Jr. Addition­
ally, the Author acknowledges the research assistance of Karen Hayne, Louisiana State University 
Law Center Class of 1989. 
1. Justice Marshall's judgment has been informed greatly by his experience in the segregated 
South as the grandson of a slave and by his training at the Howard University School of Law-a 
school dedicated in the early twentieth century to the establishment of a class of black lawyers 
who would assault the shackles of racial discrimination and unfair treatment. True to that training 
and to an ethic of racial advancement, Marshall became a young lawyer whose pursuit of his peo-
93 
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dismissed. 
The 200th anniversary of the Constitution was not only a time 
of 
celebration, but also a time of widespread political debate over 
the 
meaning of the Constitution's text and whether it should be constru
ed 
in keeping with the "original intent" of the Framers. Justice Marsha
ll 
chose this time to sound a discordant note to the self-congratulatory 
theme of the bicentennial celebration. In a speech before the San Fran­
cisco Patent and Trademark Law Association, Justice Marshall 
presented a simple theme: That the Constitution as originally written 
was profoundly racist.2 
That the Constitution is a racist document is a powerful statement 
and one demanding close scrutiny, especially since the Constitution 
does not explicitly mention slavery and race and deals squarely with the 
issue of slavery in only three places. 3 Article I, section 2, clause 3 appor­
tioned direct or capitation taxes and membership in the House of Rep­
resentatives in accordance with population, but counted a slave as only 
three-fifths of a person.• Article I, section 9, clause 1 forbade Congress 
to limit the importation of slaves until 1808, a period of twenty years.� 
pie's civil rights compromised his financial welfare until he received an appointment to the legal 
staff of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which staff he later 
headed until his appointment to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1961. Marshall 
served as Solicitor General from 1965 until 1967, when he took his seat on the Supreme Court. See 
R. BLAND, PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAW, THE LEGAL CAREER OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
3. 11, 22, 130, 157, 178-179 (1973); M. TusHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGRE· 
GATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 30-31, 45-47 (1987). 
2. Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Document? 40 
V AND. L. REV. 1337 (1987). Justice Marshall avoided use of the term "racist"; the gravamen of his 
complaint respecting the Constitution, however, is that the Constitution actively tolerated slavery, 
a virulent manifestation of racism. 
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. l; art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The clause provides: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may 
be
. included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be deter· mined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a 
Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. 
Id. By extension, Arti_cle I, _§ 2, clause 3 affected the scheme of selecting the President and Vice· 
President, as defined m Article II, § 1, clause 2, which provided for their election by "a Number of 
Electo�s, eq_ual to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which [each] State may 
be entitled 1� the Co.ngress .. .. " Moreover, Article I, § 2, clause 3 was buttressed by Article I, § 9, c�ause 4, which provided that "{n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid unless in Propor· 
tio� lo the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." Article V excluded both Art1c
!e I. §, 2, clause 3 and Article I, § 9, clause 1 from amendment until 1808. 
;i. U.::;. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. l. The clause provides: 
The Migration_ or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admi_t. shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight h
d
u
l
n
l
dred
f 
and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten 
o ar� or each Person. 
ld 
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Article IV, section 2, clause 3 p rovided that fugitive slaves who escaped 
into another state would be returned to their owners.6 Historians uni­
versally concede that this treatment of slavery was the result of com­
promise between proslavery and antislavery forces at the Constitutional 
Convention, represented largely by Southern and Northern States re­
spectively. Without this compromise, the new Constitution and the 
union of states that it represented might not have been possible. 
This Article is intended to examine Justice Marshall's position 
that, because of the manner in which the Constitution dealt with the 
matter of race and slavery, the Constitution was "defective from the 
start."7 Part II of this Article contrasts Justice Marshall's position on 
the framing of the Constitution with the positions of his critics. Part III 
argues that Justice Marshall's position is defensible even on broader 
grounds than he articulated, for to a significant extent the role that 
slavery played in the compromise that produced the Constitution ce­
mented political control of the federal government in the hands of the 
slave states. Part IV suggests some implications of the constitutional 
compromise on slavery for the study of the Constitution and American 
law. 
II. THE MARSHALL THESIS AND ITS CRITICS 
In his speech Justice Marshall refused to accept "a complacent be­
lief that the vision of those who debated and compromised in Philadel­
phia yielded the 'more perfect Union'" that many claim we now enjoy. 
Instead, he questioned the Framers' "wisdom, foresight, and sense of 
justice," and found them not "particularly profound," indeed, morally 
offensive. 8 Marshall argued that the Framers of the Constitution delib­
erately ignored the interests of slaves and protected the institution of 
�lavery. Thus they compromised individual liberty to selfish economic 
interest. 9 He concluded that the government devised by the Framers 
Was "defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil 
war, and momentous social transformation to attain the system of con­
stitutional government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and 
human rights, we hold as fundamental today."10 The Constitution as 
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. The clause provides: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into 
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such 
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service o r  
Labour may b e  due 
Id. 
. 
7. Marshall, supra note 2, at 1338. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
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originally framed not only was not color-blind in pro
tecting individual 
liberty, but also was consciously and intentionally op
pressive with re­
spect to color and race. 
In support of his position Justice Marshall suggested an 
examina­
tion of the first three words of the Constitution, "We th
e People." 
Slaves were not counted among "the People" who established 
the Con­
stitution. Even while slaves were counted as three-fifths of a p
erson for 
purposes of determining the voting power of whites, the slaves 
them­
selves obtained no rights as persons and would remain ignored b
y the 
federal government until the passage of the Civil War Amendments.
11 
As the Constitution ignored the rights of slaves, it also perpetuated 
the institution of slavery. Justice Marshall pointed out that the Const
i­
tution permitted the import trade in slaves to continue and even guar­
anteed that the trade would persist for at least twenty years.12 Northern 
States acceded to this demand in return for Southern support for the 
commerce clause of the Constitution. Moreover, New Englanders em­
ployed in the "carrying trade" expected to profit from both the trans­
port of slaves from Africa and the goods produced in America by 
slaves.13 
Justice Marshall argued that the Constitution was not only oppres­
sive to the rights of black slaves, but also oppressive to the rights of 
free blacks.14 The Constitution carried with it the inherent contradic­
tion "between guaranteeing liberty and justice for all and denying both 
to Negroes."111 In support of this statement Justic� Marshall quoted 
�l. Id. at 13�0-41; see U.S. CoNST. amend. XIII, § l, amend. XIV, § 1, amend. XV, § 1 . 
Section 1 to the thirteenth amendment tate . "N · h I · · t . . s s. e1t er s avery nor mvoluntary servitude, 
excep 
as � punishment for crime whe�eof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
Umted States, or any place sub1ect to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1. Section 1 to 
the fourteenth amendment states: 
' 
All persons born or naturali ed · th U · d S 
are citizens of th U "ted S 
z m e mte tates, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
f I 
e �1 tates and of the State wherein they reside No State shall make or 
en orce any aw which sh II b "d h . . . 
· 
States· no h 11 S 
a a 
.
r1 ge t e privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
f I '. 
r s
d 
a any tate deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
o aw, nor eny to any pers 'th" . . . . . 
· • 
U.S. CONST. amend XIV 
on
. 
wi m its Jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
the United States �o t
' § 
�· �
ect10� 1 to the fifteenth amendment states: "The right of citizens of 
account of race color
vo
o 
e s a . not e dd
��ied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
12 M h
' 
11 
, r previous con ition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend XV § 1 . ars a 
' supra note 2 at 1339· s US C 
. 
' . 
underscored and further ro 
' ' ee . · . ·
. 
O�ST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. This guarantee was 
importation clause might n
p
ot
t
b
ected by
d 
t
d
h� prohibition m Article V of the Constitution that th
e 
e amen e m any wa · t th . 
. 
clause was not an insigni"fi t . 
Y prior o e year 1808. The slave 1mportat1on 
. can concession and cont 'b ted h . . Africans . . into the United State d . 
' ri u to t e 1mportat10n of "about as manY 
ous hundred
. 
and sixty years of the� �
r�ng t�e thirty. years from 1780 to 1810 as during the pre
vi­
TIME ON THE CROSS 24 (1974). 
. . mvo vement m the slave trade." R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, 
13. Marshall, supra note 2, at 1338. 
14. Id. at 1340. 
1."i. Id. 
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Chief Justice Roger Taney's 1857 opinion in Scott v. Sandford,16 which 
stated that blacks, both slave and free, "are not included, and were not 
intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, 
and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that 
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States."17 
In fact, Chief Justice Taney opined that at the time of the framing of 
the Constitution, blacks "had no rights which the white man was bound 
to respect. "18 
The constitution that Justice Marshall would celebrate, therefore, 
is not the Constitution framed at the Philadelphia convention in 1787 
and ratified by the states in the months that followed, but is instead a 
different constitution, forged in the crucible of the Civil War, after 
which the Union survived, but the Constitution did not. In its place 
"arose a new, more promising basis for justice and equality"-the four­
teenth amendment-which "ensur[ed] protection of the life, liberty, 
and property of all persons against deprivations without due process, 
and guarantee[d] equal protection of the laws."19 To celebrate that first 
Constitution, argued Justice Marshall, would be "little more than a 
blind pilgrimage to the shrine of the original document. "20 Instead, he 
suggested the need for "a sensitive understanding of the Constitution's 
inherent defects, and its promising evolution through 200 years of his­
tory. "21 That evolution cannot be understood as occurring by the pro­
cess of interpretation, but rather as the result of a revolution that came 
in the form of amendments to the Constitution-amendments that 
abolished slavery and ensured that citizens of all races would be equal 
under the law.22 
In Justice Marshall's view, recognition of that revolution is neces­
sary to celebrate the Constitution for what it truly is: A living docu­
ment with a history both proud and ugly.23 That history includes 
constitutional enslavement and, later, constitutional emancipation. The 
history includes disenfranchisement and segregation under the Consti­
tution, and later the beginnings of racial equality under the same docu­
ment. 2• Because the consequences of slavery bore greatly on the 
American Constitution and on American law, Justice Marshall argued 
16.  (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
17. Id. at 404. 
18. Id. at 407. Chief Justice Taney's opinion on the citizenship of blacks holds only the sta-
tus of dicta and is founded on questionable historical interpretation. See infra note 108. 
19. Marshall, supra note 2, at 1340-41 (emphasis in original). 
20. Id. at 1341. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1340-41. 
23. Id. at 1341-42. 
24. Id. at 1340-41 .  
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that to understand, to appreciate, and to celebrate the Constitution one 
must consider the institution of slavery and the concessions the Fram­
ers made to it. 211 
Justice Marshall's views received immediate and extensive recogni-
tion in the media. Headlines throughout the country read similarly to 
that in the Los Angeles Times: "Marshall on Constitution: 'Defective 
from Start.' "26 The Marshall thesis instigated widespread response 
from both public and private organizations and individuals. 
The Washington Legal Foundation, for example, suggested that the 
· Justice resign his seat on the Supreme Court because his remarks "re­
flect[ed] a deepseated bitterness and dislike that impair his capacity."21 
The National Review suggested that Justice Marshall merely was igno­
rant of the peculiarities and limitations of eighteenth century liberalism 
under which blacks, as Chief Justice Taney had indicated in 1857, were 
the peculiar exception to the equality to which all men were otherwise 
heirs.28 
The initial reactions of shock and dismay to Justice Marshall's 
comments that the Framers and the document they produced were 
morally deficient are understandable. Marshall's comments might well 
seem incongruous, for they came at a time "dedicated to the memory of 
the Founders,"29 whose "achievements . . . knowledge and experience," 
as well as "the nature of the government they established, its origins, its 
character, and its ends," had become the subject of reverent remem­
brance.30 Shock and dismay were precisely the initial reactions of Don­
ald Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, who thought at first that "the 
remarks were a gratuitous insult to our charter document and to such 
Frai:ners as Madison and Franklin, whose memories we honor."31 Upon 
further reflection and after reading the full text of Marshall's speech, 
ho�ever, Secretary Hodel conceded that the Justice's remarks inspired 
a d�fferent r�s�onse. No honor was lost in recognizing that "the Consti­
t�t10�, as �ngmally drafted, was not perfect in all respects."32 The Con­
st1tut1on did, after all, condone slavery, and this condonation was one of 
25. Id. at 1338. 
26. L.A. Times, May 7, 1987, § l, at 4, col. 1. 
27. 102 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 19, 1987, at 12. 
28. 39 NAT'L REV. 16 (1987). 
29. COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF TH U S 
YBAR'S REPORT: PREPARATION FOR C 
E NITED TATES CONSTITUTION, FIRST FULL 
note 2, at 1337: 
A OMMEMORATION 6 (Sept. 1986), quoted in Marshall, supra 
30. COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE U S 
(Sept. 17, 1985), quoted in Marshall SU t 2 
NITED TATES CONSTITUTION, FIRST REPORT 6 
• pra no e , at 1337 31. D. Hodel, Remarks of the Secretar of the 1 . · . State& Supreme Court Building as a Histo .Y 1 L d 
ntenor at Ceremomes De dicating the United 
N R 
nca an mark Washin t D c D ews elease, at 2 (May 12, 1987). ' g on · . , ept. of the Interior 
32. Id. 
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the "significant failings of the original document."33 In Secretary Ho­
del's view, however, these failings were not cause for condemnation, be­
cause the Framers had created the amendment process for the express 
purpose of correcting the Constitution's failings.3' 
William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, in a speech at Van­
derbilt University, took a stance similar to Secretary Hodel's-a stance 
critical of the Constitution's failings but, with the hindsight of history, 
optimistic about the Constitution's capacity to accommodate change.311 
The Constitution, Reynolds recognized, 
was intended to be the culmination of a great struggle for the natural rights of men . 
. . . When the Framers sought to protect in the Constitution the fundamental 
rights of man but failed to guarantee explicitly those rights to every individual, 
they introduced a self-contradiction that preordained struggles and conflicts we 
continue to confront today. 38 
Reynolds argued that "to be reminded of the compromise on slavery 
during the making of the Constitution" was reasonable, but that it was 
not reasonable to encourage the view of two constitutions-one framed 
in 1787 and another that emerged from the Civil War's aftermath. 37 Ac­
c ording to Reynolds, it was our system of constitutional government, 
"one of divided governmental authority and separated government 
p owers,"38 that allowed the Civil War Amendments to be effective. 
On the issue of slavery, Reynolds contended that "the Framers 
were faced with a Robson's choice," for consensus on the new Constitu­
tion required the assent of the Southern States.39 The Framers were 
limited to settling for the maintenance of slavery in a constitutional 
system that was amenable to slavery's elimination and sown with "the 
seeds for the expansion of freedom to all individuals when circum­
stances would permit."'0 Moreover, the Justices on the Supreme Court 
shared the blame with the Framers because of their "loose, disingenu­
ous, and result-oriented" decisions such as the Scott v. Sandford.41 In 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 3. 
35. Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent Constitution, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1987) �h�reinafter Another View]. Another View is indeed a different view from Justice Marshall's, but 
it 19 the same view that Reynolds has espoused previously. See Reynolds, Securing Liberty in an 
Egalitarian Age, 52 Mo. L. REV. 585 (1987). But see Middleton, Securing Justice: A Response to 
William Bradford Reynolds, 52 Mo. L. REV. 607 (1987). 
36. Another View, supra note 35, at 1345. 37. Id. 
38. Id. at 1346. 
39. Id. at 1347. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 1348 (quoting Cooper & Lund, Landmarks of Constitutional Interpretation, 40 
PoL'y REv., Spring 1987, at 20). 
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Scott the Court forewent the opportunity to extend the principles of 
equality under the Constitution and instead allowed "the theoretical 
opinions of individuals . . . to control . . . [the Constitution's] 
meaning. "·'2 
The confession and avoidance gloss on constitutional history elabo­
rated by Secretary Hodel and Assistant Attorney General Reynolds was 
typical of many of the responses to the Marshall thesis. Critics, how­
ever, were hard pressed to disagree that acceptance of and support for 
the institution of slavery was an unfortunate facet of the 1787 Constitu­
tion. Yet that failing, the critics stressed, does not shatter the essential 
greatness of the original document, because the moral compromise was 
a political necessity; and more importantly, the compromise was preg­
nant with the means for outgrowing even this defect. 
For example, Jack Valenti, writing in the New York Times, sug­
gested that to omit the black and the slave from the protection of the 
Constitution's umbrella of liberty was a necessary evil. Otherwise, the 
issue of slavery "would [have] rupture[d] the unity so sorely required" 
for the Constitutional Convention to succeed and the union of states to 
survive. 43 Syndicated columnist Cal Thomas wrote that if Justice Mar­
shall was right to argue that the Framers "believed liberty and equality 
to be the exclusive preserve of white males," the Justice was nonethe­
less wrong to assert that the government devised by the Framers was 
defective from the start."" According to Thomas, "the Constitution's 
real strength ... is derived from its grounding in a set of fixed abso­
lutes"-absolutes that render the Constitution "a self-correcting docu­
ment."•� The amendment process, in conjunction with the ideological 
absolutes of liberty, constitutes "one of the document's great 
strengths. "46 Columnist Robert Akerman recognized that the Framers 
demonstrated "a sacrifice of 'moral principles' to economic interests," 
yet he argued that the Framers should not be blamed, for "the 'moral 
principles' of the age did not permit any tampering," and the Constitu­
tion did provide for an amending process through which "slavery could 
have been abolished by amendment at any time the society was ready 
to do it.""7 Moreover, Akerman argued, the Framers had established a 
structure of government u nder which "the will of the majority must be 
42. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scot), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 620-21 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissent-
ing), quoted in Another View, supra note 35, at 1348. . . 
43. Valenti, Despite Slavery, a Constitution that Built a Nation, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1987, 
at 27, col. 1 (city ed.). 
44. Houston Post, May 15, 1987, at B2, col. 1. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
h w 47. Akerman, Justice Marshall Takes Us Part of t e ay to Understanding Constitution, 
Atlanta Const., May 10, 1987, at C3, col. 1. 
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enacted with due regard for minority rights."0 These responses imply 
that Marshall's thesis suffers from a selective focus on the molehill of 
slavery and from a refusal, at best ignorant and at worst contumacious, 
to recognize the mountain of greatness in the original Constitution. 
The Atlanta Constitution called such critical comments the sounds 
of " [l]esser men sniping at Justice Marshall" and opined that "[a]n ap­
palling number of cheap righteousness points are being run up by per­
sons willfully misunderstanding [Marshall's thoughts]."49 This Article 
takes no position on whether the critics' failure to understand was will­
ful or even petty. This Article will show, however, that the failure of 
understanding is real and substantial-that Justice Marshall's critics 
rushed to judgment partially blinded by the dazzle of the bicentennial 
celebration. 
Part III will argue that the commentators have failed to reckon 
with the details of the compromise on slavery. Thus, the commentators 
have missed an otherwise inescapable conclusion: Even if the Constitu­
tion had within it the seeds of change, no change compromising the 
institution of slavery and the economic interests that it represented 
could take place without the consent of the slave states. At its core, the 
original document was intended to place control over the levers of 
change in the hands of those who could not be expected to permit the 
institution of slavery to weaken. The Constitution, by design, delivered 
political control of the federal government to the South. If the Consti­
tution eventually changed to accomplish for blacks the individual liber­
ties afforded to whites, it changed not because of an internal imperative 
mandating the substitution of freedom for slavery, but instead because 
of an extraconstitutional act of colossal proportions-the Civil War. 
Ill. ORIGINAL INTENT: PROTECTION FOR SOUTHERN INTERESTS IN 
SLAVERY 
None of the participants could have doubted that slavery would be 
a subject of discussion at the Philadelphia convention. England's main­
land colonies had developed a long history of slavery. In certain colo­
nies, legislatures had sanctioned slavery soon after empirical experience 
with the subject. M assachusetts, for example, sanctioned slavery in 
1641, three years after the first recorded existence of slavery in the col­
ony. 50 In Carolina, before the first blacks arrived, the constitution 
48. Id. 
49. Lesser Men Sniping at Justice Marshall, Atlanta Const., May 16, 1987, at Al8, col. 1. 
50. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATl'ER OF COLOR, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: 
THE COLONIAL PERIOD 61-62 (1978). John Winthrop's journal "of 1638 is apparently 'the earliest 
recorded account of Negro slavery in New England. . . . Negroes may have been enslaved before 
that time b ut ear l ier allusions to slavery are inferential and even contemporaries were apparently 
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drafted for the governance of the colony that later became North Caro­
lina and South Carolina111 guaranteed the authority of every free person 
over every slave.112 Other states gradually adopted the institution of 
slavery. The first blacks arrived in Virginia in 1619, before blacks had 
arrived in Massachusetts, and although Virginia's legislature and courts 
would deal on a piecemeal basis with problems occasioned by the exis­
tence of slavery,53 it was not until 1680 and 1682 that the colony passed 
its first slave codes. 5" In 1735, three years after the granting of Georgia's 
charter, the trustees of that colony passed a law outlawing the use of 
blacks as slaves.511 The p assage of this law did not mean that Georgians 
were nonracialists, for concomitant to prohibiting slavery the trustees 
banned the importation of all blacks into the colony.56 A scant fifteen 
years later, in 1750, largely for economic reasons, Georgia repealed the 
ban on slavery. A statute encouraging slavery was passed in its stead 
and Georgia soon established one of the harshest slave codes of the 
period.57 
Even in 1776, when the statement "all men are created equal" was 
etched into the consciousness and the conscience of America, the laws 
of each of the states countenanced slavery.118 The ascendency of slavery, 
however, was less complete in 1787, the year of the framing of the Con­
stitution. Massachusetts had ended slavery through judicial interpreta­
tion of its constitution, which had provided that all men were "free and 
equal."59 Vermont, which became the Nation's fourteenth state, had 
no more certain of the facts.'" Id. at 61 (quoting L. GREEN, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENG· 
LAND, 1620-1776, at 17 (1942)). The 1641 Body of Liberties made an exception to its prohibition 
against slavery so that slaves might be 
lawful captives taken in juste warres, and such strangers as willfully sell themselves or are 
sold t� us. �nd these shall h�ve all the liberties and Christian usages which the law of God 
establtshed m Israeli concernmg such persons doth morally require. This exempts none from 
servitude who shall be judged thereto by Authoritie. 
COLONIAL LAws OF MASSACHUSEITS REP. FROM 1660 SUPP. TO 1672, at 91 (1889), quoted in A. HIG­
GINBOTHAM, supra, at 62. 
51. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 153 & n.12. 
52. The Fundamental Constitution of Carolina drawn up by John Locke, 1 S.C. Stats. at 
Large 55 (Cooper 1936). 
53. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 22-30, 32-38 . 
. 
54 . .  Act X (1680), reprinted in 2 Va. Stats. at Large 481 (Hening 1823); Act III (1682), re-
printed in id. at 492. 
55. 1 A. CANDLER, COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 50-52 (1904). 
56. Id. 
57. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 217, 236-66. 
58. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLI· 
TICS 15-17 (1978). 
?9. The litigation that ended slavery in Massachusetts concerned the slave Quock Walker 
and involved three cases: Walker v. Jennison (1781), reprinted in 1873-75 PRoc M H Soc. 
296; Jen
_
ni�on v. Caldwell (1781), repri�ted in id.; and Commonwealth v. Je�nis:�
s. (l ;��·), re­
printed in id. The cases are repro duced m 4 H. CATTERALL, JumcIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN 
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outlawed slavery explicitly in i ts  constitution.60 Pennsylvania, Rhode Is­
land, and Connecticut each had passed gradual emancipation statutes 
intended to eliminate slavery.61 Delaware, Maryland, New York, New 
Jersey, and Virginia had passed laws prohibiting the importation of 
slaves within their borders.62 Abolitionist societies had been instituted 
SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 478-81 (1968). Article I of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 
provided: 
All men are free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among 
which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that o f  
acquiring, possessing, and protecting pro perty; in tine, that of seeking and obtaining their 
safety and happiness. 
MASS. CONST. art. I (1780), reprintPd in MASS. GEN. STATS. 15 (1860). The provisions of the 1780 
constitution were not such a far cry from the Massachusetts 1691 colonial charter, which mandated 
that every inhabitant of the colony "shall enjoy all Liberties and Immunities of Free and natural) 
[sic] Subjects." Charter of the Province of Massachusetts-Ray 1691. at l, 14, reprinted in 1 ACTS 
AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETIS-BAY, 1692-1714 (1869). Reported cases do not 
reveal that slave status was ever challenged as a violation of the colonial charter or that the charter 
was construed otherwise to prohibit slavery. See 4 H. CATIERALL, supra, at 465-81. Courts constru­
ing the free and equal clause of the constitution, however, had the benefit of Lord Mansfield's 
opinion in Somerset v. Stewart, 12 Geo. 3 (Lofft 1772), reprinted in 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772), 
which had declared that slavery lacked the support of positive law and was "so odious, that noth­
ing can be suffered to support [it]." 98 Eng. Rep. at 510. See Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield 
and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 86, 115, 124-25 
(1974). The Quack Walker litigation is described in A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 91-99; see 
also Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts: More Notes on 
the "Quack Walker Case," 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1961); O'Brien, Did the Jennison Case Out­
law Slavery in Massachusetts? 17 WM. & MARY Q. 219 (1960). 
60. See 12 A. SOULE, STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT 8 (1964). Article I of the Declaration of 
�ights in the Vermont Constitution of 1777 provided that "all men are born equally free and 
Independent," and forbade servitude for any male past the age of twenty-one and for any female 
past the age of eighteen, "unless they are bound by their own consent, after they arrive at such 
age, or bound by law, for the payment of debts, damages, fines, costs, or the like." Id.; see also A. 
ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 116 (1967). But 
compare the treatment by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of the "free and independent" 
clause of the state's 1776 Declaration of Rights, in Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen & M.) 133 
0806). The Declaration of Rights declared 
[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, 0: which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive o r  
divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring 
and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 
lO W. SWINDLER, SouRCES AND DocuMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 49 (1979). The Decla­
ration of Rights, it was found, "was notoriously framed with a cautious eye [on the subject o f  slaves] , and was meant t o  embrace the case of free citizens o r  aliens only." Hudgins, 11 Va. (1  Hen 
& M.) at 141 (Tucker, J.). The court limited the application of the Declaration of Rights to "white persons and native American Indians" and rejected the notion that the Declaration of Rights ap­plied to 
"native Africans and their descendants who have been and are now held as slaves." Id. at 
144. 
' 
61. See W . DuBois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 1638-1870, at 23, 36, 37 (1965); see also P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, 
FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 43-44 (1981). 
t 62. See W. DuBois, supra note 61, at 12-15, 19, 24-25; see also P. FINKELMAN, supra note 61, a 45; A. ZILVERSMIT, supra note 60, at 155. 
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in several states,83 and thoughtful Southerners found slavery to be a 
questionable moral practice.84 Some slaveholders even questioned the 
economic benefits of slavery.811 And some Americans, especially in the 
North and the Mid-Atlantic South, hoped that slavery would gradually 
disappear. 88 
Yet slavery was still both a social and economic fact of American 
life at the time of the Constitutional Convention. Slavery was of lesser 
importance in the North, where the proportion of slaves to the free 
population was small and where the economic impact of slavery was 
minimal. Slavery was of much greater importance in the South, where 
slavery's tremendous economic significance had spawned a slave popu­
lation so great that it posed a threat to social control.67 As an important 
aspect of American life, slavery warranted major consideration at the 
Constitutional Convention. 
A. Representation in Congress and the Three-Fifths Clause 
Many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention believed 
that one of the major faults of the Articles of Confederation was that 
63. A. ZILVERSMIT, supra note 60, at 147, 162-63, 173-74. Abolitionist societies already existed 
in New York and Pennsylvania; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey established 
societies by 1794. Id. 
64. Patrick Henry of Virginia wrote of "an abhorrence of slavery," and was struck by the 
inherent conflict in the existence of slavery "in a country, above all others, fond of liberty." Letter 
from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), reprinted in H. COMMAGER & R. MORRIS, 
THE SPIRIT OF 'SEVENTY-SIX: THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS TOLD BY PARTICIPANTS 
402 (1975) .. George Washington wrote of his desire for some plan of gradual abolition. 
Letter to 
John Francis Mercer (Sept. 9, 1786), reprinted in 11 W. FORD, THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHING­
TON 62 (1891). Thomas Jefferson, who had written in the first draft of the Declaration of Indepen­
dence that slavery �iolate.d the "most sacred rights of life and liberty," Draft, Declaration 
of 
Independence, reprinted m H. �OMMAGER & R. MORRIS, supra, at 316, believed that the "com­
merce �e�ween ma�ter and slave 1s a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions, the most 
unrem1ttmg despotism on the one part, and degrading submissions on the other. Indeed I tremble 
for my country when I reflect that God is just .. . !" 20 A. LIPSCOMB & A. BERGH THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 225-28 (1903) r · t d · B M 
' 
N ' eprm e zn . AYO, JEFFERSON HIMSELF: THE PERSONAL AR· 
RATIVE OF A MANY-SIDED AMERICAN 35 (1942). 
65· S�e 7 P. Fo�cE, AMERICAN ARCHIVES, 494, 523, 616, 641 600 530 (4th ser 1837) (noting 
the resolutions of Prmce George C 1 H · 
' 
' · d 
. . . . 
• u pepper, anover, Prmcess Anne Fairfax and Nasemon 
Counties m V1rgmia). Nasemond County resolved that the "Africa t d
' 
· · · '· t this Col­
ony, obstructs the 0 ulation f . 
n ra e IS IIlJunous o 
_ 
· ts f E 
P P 0 it by freemen, prevents manufacturers and other useful em m1gran rom urope from settling a d . f 
t d · t h' 1 ,, 
mong us, an occasions an annual increase of the balance o ra e agams t is co ony. Id. at 530 (emphasis in original). 
66. See W. DUBOIS supra note 61 t 50 D F ls 
· f te t · ' 
• a ; 
· 
EHRENBACHER supra note 58 at 19· see a 0 m ra x accompanymg notes 140-42 Wh h . . 
' , 
' 
. . 
questionable. Freehlin Th F d' 
· 
et er this view was reasonable or wishful thinkmg is 
67 See H APTH:· 
e oun zng Fathers and Slavery, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 81, 86-90 (1972). 
Revie�. 56 Tu�. L. RE��i�
M
��1�;-�1�
;G
(
RO SLAVE �EV?LTS (1983); cf. Cottrol & Diamond, Book 
COLOR· RACE AND THE AME 
' L 
1982) (reviewmg A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF . RICAN EGAL PROCESS· T C 
· 
· 
be 
concerns over slavery and securit . th N 
· HE OLONIAL PERIOD (1978)) (discussing t 
Y m e orthern States). 
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each state had received the same number of votes in Congress.88 Many 
representatives, especially those of the large states, perceived a need to 
rectify this matter. On the third day of the Convention, when Virginia's 
Governor Edmund Randolph proposed as part of the "Virginia Plan"89 
that representation in the new Congress be divided not equally among 
states, but instead be proportioned on the basis of population,70 contro­
versy over the question of slavery was inevitable. Despite all the conflict 
it produced between large and small states, Randolph's proposal was 
not unreasonable. By introducing population as the basis of voting 
power, however, Randolph had broached the subject of whether and 
how to count the slave population. Randolph's proposal provided that 
votes in Congress be apportioned according to either "the number of 
free inhabitants" or "the Quotas of contribution," whichever was 
deemed more appropriate under the circumstances.71 By "Quotas of 
contribution" Randolph meant to grant representation for interests in 
slaves.72 
The slavery issue casts a peculiar light on the Convention's repre­
sentation debate. Popular historical mythology teaches that small states 
favored equal representation and large states favored proportional rep­
resentation. This statement is only partially true and is misleading in 
its simplicity. The three most populous states, Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
and Massachusetts, were staunch supporters of  proportional represen­
tation. Three of the smallest states, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Dela­
ware, fought vigorously for equal representation. Yet the relatively 
unpopulous states of South Carolina and Georgia provided staunch, un-
68. See, e.g., 1 W. BENTON, 1787: DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION 104, 149 (1986) (remarks of 
James Wilson of Penns ylvania); id. at 1 14 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton of New York); id. at �24-25 (remarks of James Madison of Virginia); id. at 141 (remarks of William Pierce of Georgia); 
id. at 141-42 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts). This position was not unanimous and 
was generall y at odds with the position of smaller states. See, e.g., id. at 134 (remarks of Roger 
Sherman of C on necticut). 
69. 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-22 (1911); see also 
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 953-63 (C. 
Tansill comp. 1927) . 
70. 1 M. FARRAND, supra n ote 69, at 20. 
71. Id. 
72. The term "Quotas of contribution" finds its genesis in the attempts of the Continental 
Congress to overcome the limitations of Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation, which had designated the value of land as the measure of the contribution each state would make to the payment of the national government's expenses. This method of apportionment had been inade­
quate, and Congress had fastened upon a more w orkable, more ascertainable formula by basing the apportionment of revenues on population. Slaves were counted under this formula by adding three-fifths of their number to make the "proportion" or "quota" that each state was expected t o  contribute. Thus, i n  proposing t o  base representation on quotas o f  contribution, Randolph was proposing to base representation in part on the slave population. See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTI­
NENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 at 41 230 258 (1922)· 25 id. at 637-38, 951-52; 30 id. at 102-08 
(19 ' ' ' ' 
' 
24); see also infra text accompan ying notes 95-101. 
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wavering support for proportional representation, while the relatively 
populous state of New York was steadfast in favor of equal representa­
tion.73 Virginia's James Madison described the stark conflict among the 
states concerning slavery and representation: " [T]he States were di­
vided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by 
other circumstances . . . principally from [the effects of] their having or 
not having slaves."7' The great division in the young United States did 
not lie between large and small states, in Madison's view, but between 
those of the North and those of the South, and the difference arose over 
slavery.711 Equal representation meant that the eight states above the 
Mason-Dixon line would hold sway over the five below it. For the union 
of states to succeed, however, the North would have to give the South 
"defensive power" to protect slavery.76 In Madison's view, equal repre­
sentation would not accomplish this goal.77 
Even while Southerners in western Virginia and in Franklin (west­
ern North Carolina) were agitating for statehood,78 the delegates in 
Philadelphia were aware that the people of Maine were instigating a 
separation from Massachusetts,79 that Vermont would soon be a state,80 
and that Congress under the Articles of Confederation had designated as many as five new free states to be carved out of the Northwest Terri­tory.91 Equality of representation reasonably could be anticipated to 
t:l. S. LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 174, 204 (1967); D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-1820, at 177-78 (197 1 ) .  74.  I M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 486. 
be 
If>. Madison thought it "pretty well understood that the real difference of interests lay not tween the le
f
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smell. but between the N. & Southn. States. The institution of slavery & its consequences orme the hne of d' · · t" " · t 486 ( k f J iscnmma ion. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69 at 10· see also 1 id. e remer s o  ames M d' ) 2 ·d ' ' 1 w B a ison ; 1 · at 450 (remarks of Charles Pinckney of South Carolina); . E
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o
h
N, su
h
pra note 68• at 371 (remarks of Rufus King of Massachusetts who was "fully convince et t e questio · d. • ... _ d. d b 
n concerning a ifference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto ,.,en iscusse , etween the great and 11 S b 76 I M F 
sma tates; ut between the Southern and Eastern") .  �-
· . ARRAND, supra note 69, at 486. � ' ·  Id.; see also 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 371-72 i 8. See 2 M. FARRAND supra note 69 t 455 ( . also S EASLEY. HISTORY OF TENNESSEE 189 g a remar.ks of Luther Martin of Maryland); see MITCHEL. TENNESSEE A SHORT H 79- 8 <1887 & reprint 1979); S. FoLMSBEE, R. CORLEW. & E. _ , . ' ISTORY -97 (1969) ' 9. 1
. 
\\ BENTON. supra note 68, at 363. 
. 
llO. 8i>e 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69 at 455 ( 8 1 .  Act of .July 13 1787 (th N h , remarks of Luther Martin) .  ' e ort west Ordinan ) V · . PERS Of' THE UNITED STATES 39 48 49 (C c ce ' art. ' reprinted m 2 TERRITORIAL PA· al.rn I M FARRAND, supra note 
,
69 - t 541
. 
( 
arter ed. 1934) [hereinafter TERRITORIAL PAPERS) ;  see hv the Con\'ention on September 
'
1� . 1787.
r
��r;s of Rufus King).  The Constitution was adopted we�t Ordinance was adopted by th C 
. · ARRAND, supra note 69, at 641 665. The North-'rlrl . · e ontmental Con J 1 
' .  itinne lly , although the Ph'l d 1 h. . gress on u Y 13 , 1787, two months earlier. h ( · · . 1 8 e P 1a convention wa d d . 1 e 11n�t1tut1onal Conventi'on 1 s con ucte m secret several delegates to 1 were e so repres tat' . • >11rk anrl forth from Philadelphia t N y k 
en ives m Congress, and a number carried tales th � h 0 ew or Congre • · f " · urt west Ordi nance even wh'l b · d 
' ss s seat at the time. Thus the provisions o · ' 1 e emg ebat d · C ' t 1n n  s I .nm, s11pra note 7:l, et 187-89· see e 
e m ongress, had an effect upon the Conven-
• ' .g., 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 363-64. It would 
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mean perpetual preponderance of Northern, nonslaveholding p ower.82 
By contrast, proportional representation meant relative advantage 
to the South for two reasons. First, with five of thirteen votes in the 
Confederation's Congress,  the South held only 38.5 percent of congres­
sional power. Under a plan of proportional representation that included 
the slave population on the same basis as the free population, the South 
would hold 49.9 percent of  congressional power. Even if no representa­
tion were given for the slave population, an unlikely result, the South, 
with 41 percent of the free population, would experience a net gain of 
2.5 percent over the equality of representation scheme.83 Thus, any plan 
of proportional representation would produce a net gain for the South. 
Once it was decided that representation in one house of the new Con­
gress would be proportioned according to population, the o nly real 
question was how large that gain would be. 
The second reason that proportional representation meant an ad­
vantage for the South was that the delegates to the Convention ex­
pected population to expand at a greater rate in the South than in the 
North. Pennsylvania's Gouverneur Morris feared that a majority of the 
Nation's population would soon live in North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Georgia.84 South Carolina's Pierce Butler dismissed that fear as a 
misapprehension of a trend that Butler saw-that "[t]he people and 
strength of America are evidently bearing Southwardly and South west-
be a mistake, however, to presume that the Northwest Ordinance implied that the Philadelphia 
convention or the Southern States believed that slavery was doomed never to expand beyond the 
states in which it existed in 1787. By its terms, the Northwest Ordinance applied only to territories 
north of the Ohio River, which included western lands already ceded by New York, Massachusetts, ?onnecticut, and Virginia, 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra, at 3, 6, 10-22, but not those lands belong­
ing to North Carolina, South Carolina, or Georgia. Of this latter group, North Carolina in 1789 and 
Georgia in 1802 specifically reserved rights to slavery in the lands they ceded, even though they 
adopted the remainder of the Northwest Ordinance as the territories' governing instrument. 4 
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra, at 3, 7; 5 id. at 142, 145. Given South Carolina's strong proslavery 
concerns at both the Philadelphia convention and the ratifying convention that followed, its act of 
cession, which was passed less than one month after the Northwest Ordinance and which did not 
mention slavery at all, indicates that South Carolina was not apprehensive about the future of 
slavery south of the Ohio River. Act of Aug. 24, 1787, 5 S.C. Stats. at Large 1346, at 4 (Cooper 
1936). The argument that the Southern States had no power to limit the authority of the federal 
government respecting sla�ery in the territories does not acknowledge that the lower South was 
under no obligation to cede its lands to the federal government. If it had been deemed impossible 
to limit the federal government's authority to prohibit slavery in the territories, the lower South 
simply would not have ceded its lands, and what became population growth in new Southern 
States simply would have been population growth in the original Southern States. This result 
would have made no difference to the political power of the South in the House of Representatives 
or to the political interests of the South as a region. 
82. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 9-10 (remarks of James Madison). 
83. See D. ROBINSON, supra note 73, at 179-80. 
84. 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 394. 
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wardly."811 Madison observed that "the people are constantly swarming 
from the more to the less populous places-from Europe to [America] 
from the Northn. & middle parts of the U.S. to the Southern & West­
ern. They go where land is cheaper, because labour is dearer."88 This 
shift of population made it reasonable to expect that the South eventu­
ally would hold a majority of the population. Thus, proportional repre­
sentation meant a plan under which many anticipated that as the 
South's population grew relative to that of the North, the South's influ­
ence and its power to protect slavery also would grow.87 
Hence arose the impetus for what has become known as the three­
fifths compromise, embodied in article I, section 2, clause 3 of the 
Constitution: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, 
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, includ­
ing those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, 
three fifths of all other Persons.88 
The "other Persons" referred to were slaves.89 Southerners at the Con-
85. Id. 
86. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 585-86. 
87. 2 
.
M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 10. Madison explained that if a plan of proportional representation were adopted, "the N. Side would still outnumber the other: but not in the same degree, at this time: and every day would tend towards an equilibrium." Id.; see also 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 394 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris and Pierce Butler) .  For Rufus King, the expected population shi�t was a reason for the North to be scrupulously fair in dealing with the Southern States on the issue of representation: 
He
. 
was far from wishing t� retain any unjust advantage whatever in one part of the Republic. If JUshce was. not the basis of the connection it could not be of long duration. He must be shorL�ighted mdeed who does not foresee that whenever the Southern States shall be more n
.
umerous that the Northern, they can and will hold a language that will awe them into jus­tice. If they threaten to separate now in case injury shall be done them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual, when force shall back their demands. Id. at :189. 
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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FRF.E j . F , ' M- a ress on the Dred Scott decision (May 14, 1857)) · E. FoNER FREE SOIL, . . ..\ROR. REE EN· THE IDEOLOGY OF THE R p ' ' ( 1 970). Antislavery forc�s f f . EPUBLICAN ARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-102 . · were ar rom unanimous on this 't' s W T CoN�T1tt1T10N A PRO-SLAVERY COMP (1856) pos1 ion. ee, e.g., . PHILLIPS, HE (. ' ACT ; see also W WIECEK TH s A y ONSTITllTl<lNAl.ISM IN AMERICA 1760_1848 · • E OURCES OF NTISLAVER guNI thnt the  Const itut ion was. a proslave; a�0229-48 (1977). Even Douglass at one time had ar­t rl'mnrks of Frederick Douglass (Jan. 17, 1�50)�.ument. See 2 DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra, at 231-32 
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vention wanted to count slaves on the same basis as free persons.90 This 
method of counting slaves would have given the South a clear advan­
tage, for the overwhelming majority of slaves were held in the South.91 
By contrast, Northern delegates did not wish to count slaves at all;92 
the relative advantage in this position was with the North.93 No repre­
sentation for the slave population, however, might have forced the 
South out of the Union; equal representation for the slave population 
might have brought the same result for the North. A compromise was 
necessary. 94 
90. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 364. For South Carolina's Charles Pinckney (to be 
distinguished from his cousin and fellow South Carolina delegate Charles Cotesworth Pinckney), 
"[t]he number of inhabitants a ppeared . . .  the only just and practicable rule. He thought the 
blacks ought to stand on equality with the whites. "  Id. Pinckney's colleagues from the state, 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Pierce Butler, agreed strenuously. See id. at 378, 386, 389. All 
members of the Southern delegaLion, however, did not hold this position. In response to a motion 
by Pierce Butler and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina-that slaves be weighted 
equally with, as opposed to three-fifths of, free persons in any rule of representation-Virginia's 
George Mason argued that despite the tremendous economic value of slaves, he "could not how­
ever regard them as equal to freemen and could not vote for them as such." Id. at 379. When 
Butler and Pinckney's motion came to a vote, only South Carolina and Georgia voted in favor; 
Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia voted against it. Id. This vote occurred after considerable 
discussion, debate, and compromise, and undoubtedly was anticipated even by the South Carolini­
ans. As part of the "South Carolina Plan," like Randolph's Virginia Plan introduced on the third 
day of the Convention, Charles Pinckney proposed that one house of the federal legislature be 
apportioned in accordance with population, "3/5 of Blacks included." Sketch of Pinckney's Plan 
for a Constitution, 1787, 9 AM. H1sT. REv. 735, 742 ( 1904). 
91 .  The 1790 census reveals that of the Nation's 698,000 slaves, 649,000, or 93% were held in 
the five most Southern States. BUREAU oF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, THE Soc1AL AND 
ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL VIEW, 1790· 
1978, at 11-12 (1979). 
92. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 299-300 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry of Massachu· 
setts) ;  id. at 368 (remarks of William Patterson of New Jersey); id. at 379, 385-87 (remarks of 
Gouverneur Morris); id. at 383-84 (remarks of Rufus King). This position was not unanimous, 
however. Regarding representation, William Johnson of Connecticut believed that "the number of 
people ought to be established as the rule, and that all descriptions including blacks equally with 
whites, ought to fall within the computation," the issue of slavery notwithstanding. Id. at 387. 
93. To be sure, politics was not the sole reason for desiring not to count slaves at all. El­
bridge Gerry of Massachusetts opined that slaves ought not be recognized as equal to freemen 
when as property slaves were on the same level as horses and cattle. Id. at 296-97. Gouverneur 
Morris believed that representation for interests in slaves would be "doing injustice to . . . human 
nature," and would give encouragement to the slave trade. Id. at 385. 
94. Rufus King feared that any representation for interests in slaves "would excite great dis­
contents among the States having no slaves." Id. at 383. North Carolina's William Davie was "sure 
that North Carolina would never confederate on any terms that did not rate them [slaves] at least 
3/5. If the Eastern States meant therefore to exclude them altogether the business was at an end." 
Id. at 387. Gouverneur Morris warned: "[I]t is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on what the 
Southern States will never agree to. It is equally vain for the latter to require what other States 
can never admit"· he believed that his own Pennsylvania would "never agree to a representation of 
Negroes." Id. Rufus King was correct in predicting that representation for interests in slaves would 
be a point of objection for nonslaveholding states in the North. See, e.g., Brutus, Essay III, N.Y. 
Journal, Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in THE EssENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST 269, 270-71 (W. Allen & G. 
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The resolution of this issue was suggested by Randolph's proposal 
that under certain circumstances representation would be based on 
"Quotas of contribution" or wealth. One view, not exclusive to either 
Northern or Southern delegates, held that government is instituted to 
protect property and to encourage wealth.95 Under this proposition, 
which embodies the views of John Locke,96 wealth and property, as "the 
Main object[s] of Gov[ernmen]t,"97 "the principal object[s] of Soci-
• ] "99 ety,"98 and the "great means of carrymg . . .  [government on, 
should be the measures of power as well. The delegates holding this 
view believed that "money was power . . . and . . . the states ought to 
have weight in the Gov[ernmen]t-in proportion to their wealth."100 
One method by which to measure wealth was to measure popula­
tion, for a state produced wealth through its labor force. While all free 
labor was presumed to be equally efficient, that same presumption of 
equality did not obtain with respect to slave labor. The Continental 
Congress had agreed in 1783, in an attempt to apportion tax burdens, 
that the value of a slave's labor was to be measured at three-fifths the 
value of a free person's.101 Though this ratio had never been applied 
under the Articles of Confederation, it provided a familiar refuge for 
those seeking to calculate the efficiency of slave labor. 
Certain Southern delegates urged at the Constitutional Convention 
that slaves and whites were equally efficient laborers, and thus that the 
weight of slave representation in Congress should be equal to that of 
whites.102 Others, such as Virginia's George Mason, "could not regard 
Lloyd eds. 1985); see also 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILA­
DEL:HIA, IN 1787'. at 227�28 (1888) (remarks at the New York ratifying convention by Melancton 
Smith, who, findmg the 1�ea of slave representation "utterly repugnant," argued against the three­
fifths clause). But s�e 2 id. at 39 (remarks at the Massachusetts ratifying convention by Samuel 
Nasson, who complamed about the tax question embodied in the three-fifths clause and remarked 
that "this state will pay as great a tax for three children in the cradle as any of the Southern 
States will for five hearty working negro men"). 
' 
95. See 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 533. Gouverneur Morris put the case as well as 
anyone at.the Convention: "The savage State was more favorable to liberty than was the Civilize
d; 
and su�c1ently so to life. It was preferred by all men who had not acquired a taste for property 
. . .  which could only be secured by the restraints of regular Government." Id. 
96. See, e.g., J. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1884)· l D ROBINSON supra 
note 73, at 184-85. 
• see a so · ' 
97. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 69 at 533 (remarks f G M · ) • o ouverneur orris . 
98. 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 358 (remarks of John Rutledge). 
99. Id. at 364 (remarks of Pierce Butler). 
100. 1 M FARRAND, supra note 69, at 196 (remarks of John Rutledge). 
101. See supra note 72. 
102. See 1 W. BENTON supra note 68 t 389 Ch l p· e-. .. . ' • a · ar es mckney argued that equality of repr sentat10n was nothmg more than justice. The blacks are th 1 b h f th South-
St t th od . 
e a ourers, t e peasants o e 
ern a es: ey are as pr uctive of pecuniary resources as those of the Northern States. TheY 
add equally to the wealth, . . .  to the strength of the nation." Id. ; see also id. at 378 (remarks of 
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. . .  [slaves] as equal to freemen and could not vote for them as 
such."103 North Carolina's Hugh Williamson agreed with the recollec­
tion of Nathanial Gorham of Massachusetts, "that if the Southern 
States contended for the inferiority of blacks to whites when taxation 
was in view, the Eastern States on the same occasion contended for 
their equality. mo• Williamson, however, concurred in neither extreme, 
but instead "approved of the ratio of 3/5."10G In the end, only South 
Carolina and Georgia voted in favor of equality of representation for 
interests in slaves, 106 and the three-fifths compromise was enshrined in 
the Constitution. 
While it is important to note what the compromise tragically im­
plied for the future of the Nation, equally noteworthy is what the com­
promise did not mean. The compromise did not mean that blacks or 
slaves were only three-fifths human. For one thing, the census counted 
a free black as a whole person, just like a free white. For another, the 
humanity of blacks was not among the many questions and points of 
controversy discussed and resolved, or even left unresolved, at the Con­
vention. The three-fifths compromise was based mainly on the issues of 
whether and to what degree the South would be advantaged in Con­
gress by its wealth in slaves; in some smaller measure the compromise 
was based on the degree to which the South would be taxed on that 
wealth. The compromise resolving those questions represented the cal­
culation that slave labor was less efficient than free labor-that five 
slaves produced as much wealth as only three free persons. 107 
Thus, the Framers should not be criticized for having agreed to 
count the slave as a fraction of a free person. To engage in such criti­
cism would logically require one to praise the Southern delegates for 
wanting to count the slave as a whole person, and, by the same reason­
ing, to redouble criticism of the Northern delegates for arguing at first 
that slaves should not be counted at all. The Southern position-that 
slaves would be governed by whites and would contribute their number 
to the determination of white power in a government in which the 
slaves themselves would have no voice-was the more racist position. 
Compromise with the North mollified this extreme position and gave 
Pierce Butler). 
103. Id. at 379. 
104. Id. Gorham recalled that Southern delegates to the Continental Congress had argued 
previously that slave labor was inferior to free labor by a factor greater than what had been de­
cided upon. Gorham announced that "[t]he arguments on the former occasion had convinced him 
that 3/5 was pretty near the just proportion and [that] he should vote according to the same 
opinion now." Id. at 378; see also D. ROBINSON, supra note 73, at 157 n. 
105. 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 379. 
106. Id. On a previous vote, Delaware had joined the two deep South states. Id. 
107. See D. Roa1NSON, supra note 73, at 156-57, 188. 
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the South some advantage in Congress, but not the complete advantage 
that the South had sought. 
None of these explanations, however, deflects Justice Marshall's 
fundamental criticism of the Framers for having agreed to the three­
fifths compromise. Justice Marshall's criticism is especially appropriate 
if the implications of Chief Justice Taney's dictum in Scott v. Sandford 
are correct: that blacks were not considered to be and could never be­
come citizens of the United States, and that in effect the government 
under the Constitution was of whites, by whites, and for whites only. 108 
Even more damning of the Framers' efforts, however, is that the three­
fifths compromise represented the expectation of a major cession of fed­
eral political power to the Southern States, whose prime interests in­
cluded the protection of slavery. 
Moreover, the delegates to the Convention were aware that the 
overrepresentation of the South in determining the course of  federal 
power was itself an incentive for the South to keep slavery intact.109 
Even if slavery became only a marginally feasible economic institution, 
the maintenance of slavery would help to maintain the South's political 
power .  Although some might argue that the South's interest in main­
taining congressional power might have led the South to free its slaves, 
108. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1857). In effect, Chief Jus­
tice Taney maintained that blacks, regardless of their status as free or slave, were mere inhabitants 
of the U nited States, never to be citizens, id. at 418-19, even if a state independently granted them 
citizenship, id. at 405-06. In reaching his conclusion, Chief Justice Taney gave emphasis to the 
mass of discriminatory state legislation and constitutional law limiting the rights of free blacks. Id. 
at 412-16; see also L. LtTWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 
(1961). Chief Justice Taney ignored or otherwise deliberately dismissed a body of politically and 
physically liberating legislative and constitutional Jaw that both free and slave states had adopted 
in the wake of the American Revolution-law that had cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the point 
that the Chief Justice was making. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19  How.) at 564, 572-76 (Curtis, J .. 
dissenting); see also Diamond & Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana's Racial Classification 
Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Lov. L. REV. 255, 260-62 (1983). The citizenship uel 
non of free blacks under the 1787 Constitution as unamended is not the subject and is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Yet, it must be pointed out that Chief Justice Taney's opinion regarding the 
citizenship of blacks was not shared by a majority of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Taney's 
opinion was styled "the opinion of the court," Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 399, but it was 
joined i n  full only by Justice Wayne, who saw fit to write his own opinion nonetheless. Id. at 454. 
Justice Daniel wrote his own opinion and did not join at all in the Taney opinion, but agreed with 
the Chief Justice on a point for point basis. Id. at 469. Four Justices, Grier, Nelson, Campbell, and 
Catron, agreed with the result as announced by Chief Justice Taney, but did not reach the issue of 
citizenship. Id. at 457 (Nelson, J . ,  concurring); id. at 469 (Grier, J.,  concurring); id. at 494 (Camp­
bell, J. concurring); id. at 519 (Catron, J., concurring). Two Justices, McLean and Curtis, dissented 
with respect to both the result and the issue of citizenship. Id. at 529 (McLean, J. ,  dissenting); id. 
at 564 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Thus, only three members of the Court had declared that blacks 
were outside the Constitution because of their race, and two members had dissented vigorously. 
This alignment hardly constituted a firm national consensus on this issue. 
109. See 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 561 (remarks of William Patterson); 2 id. at 222 
(remarks of Gouverneur Morris). 
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deny them the vote, and count their whole number instead of three­
fifths toward representation, this argument is flawed. The South could 
not have risked freeing its slaves, because freed slaves would have been 
able to vote with their feet-to leave the South for Northern lands, 
where their numbers would redound to the benefit of Northern States 
and to the detriment of the South. 
Nor should criticism on this point be mollified by the provision in 
the three-fifths clause that direct taxes would be apportioned in the 
same manner as representation in the House of Representatives.  Even 
at the Convention the delegates did not expect that the power to levy 
direct taxes would amount to much. When Rufus King of Massachu­
setts expounded on what was planned for the new government's powers 
of taxation, he spoke not of direct taxes, but stated that indirect taxa­
tion was to be substituted for the tax power of the Continental Con­
gress.1 10 Madison had the same expectation. He reported that, " it 
seemed to be understood on all hands" that "future contributions . . . 
would be principally levied on imports and exports. "111 Moreover, the 
Convention certainly had been warned by Gouverneur Morris of Penn­
sylvania: "Let it not be said that direct taxation is to be proportioned 
to representation. It is idle to suppose that the Gen[era]l Gov[ernmen]t 
can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the people scattered 
over so vast a Country."112 As a result, the potential liability to the 
South under the three-fifths clause was likely to be small, if any.113  
110. 2 id. at 6. Later, Rufus King stated that he had been correct in his appraisal o f  likely 
taxation sources. In a letter dated November 4, 1803, he wrote: 
Had it been forseen that we could raise revenue to the extent we have done, from indirect 
taxes, the Representation of Slaves wd. never have been admitted; but going upon the maxim 
that taxation and Representation are inseparable, and that the Genl. Govt. must resort to 
direct taxes, the States in which Slavery does not exist, were injudiciously led to concede to 
this unreasonable provision of the Constitution. 
3 id. at 400. 
1 1 1 .  1 Id. at 585. 
112 .  2 id. at 223. 
113. See THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 143-44 (A. Hamilton) (H. Jones ed. 1961). New York's 
Alexander Hamilton was not sanguine about the prospect of raising revenue under any system of 
direct taxation: 
It is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience 
we have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by 
direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection 
have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed, and the 
treasuries of the States have remained empty. The popular system of administration inherent 
in the nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident to a 
languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive 
collections, and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them. 
Id. Most Southerners were unconcerned about the possibility of direct taxes. Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney, possibly the staunchest of slavery's defenders at the Philadelphia convention, argued to 
the ratifying convention in South Carolina, "I did not expect that we had conceded too much to 
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B. Importation of Slaves and the 1808 Clause 
[ Vo l . 42:93 
An understanding of the Framers' e xpectations of popu lation ex­
pansion and their intentions concerning Souther� i n fiuenc� over the 
House of Representatives is critical to a proper mterpretat10n of the 
Convention's treatment of the African slave trade. The p rovis ions to 
which the Convention agreed are known as the 1808 clause: 
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States rm"." existinK 
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Con�ress pnor to the 
Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may· he im posed on 
such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Pen.;on. 1 1 • 
The provisions of the 1808 clause impliedly recognized the i nherent 
ability of Congress, under the commerce clause if no othe r  provision, to 
outlaw the importation of slaves into the Nation. 1 1 11 It is im portant, 
however, to understand that the 1808 clause was not a grant of power to 
Congress, but a limitation on Congress's power. The 1808 clause de­
manded nothing from Congress. Instead, the clause merely prevented 
Congress from acting to prohibit the African slave trade for a period of 
twenty years. 
The ratifying conventions of Southern States evinced m ixed reac· 
tions to the provisions of the 1808 clause, because the upper and lower 
Southern States had different interests concerning the imp ortation of 
slaves. South Carolina and Georgia were lightly populated and consid­
ered their strength to be southerly population expansion; 1 1 6  they con· 
sidered the slave population to be their wealth, " [their] only natural 
resource."117 One South Carolinian at the ratifying convention opined 
the Eastern States, when they allowed us a representation for a species of property which they 
have not among them." 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 283. He boasted further that "we ha\'e mad� 
the best terms for the security of this species of property [slaves] it was in our power to make." /d. 
at 286. Edwar� �utledge, Pinckney's colleague at the South Carolina convention and the Governor 
of the State, ms1sted that provisions in the Constitution relating to direct taxes worked to the 
adv:tage of the South: "All the free people (and there are few others) in the North ern States are 
� e �xe� b� th� ne� Constitution; whereas only the free people, and two fifths [sic] of the 
s aves, m t  e o�t ern tates,_ are to be rated, in the apportioning of taxes." Id. at 277. For this 
;�::.�:
e
�:����·�1���l:;·
4
��a!��: :: !�: �:�g:��a convent�on, said that the three-fifths clause "is a 
rhetorically· "Where is the t ( f t. C 
g
. 
la .convention, Governor Randolph was able to ask 
· par o he onstitution] that h t d h · · 
ery?" Id at 598 (emphas· · · · l) C . 
as a en ency to t e aboiLtzon of slau· 
. . is m ongma ompare d t 457 458 ( 
Patrick Henry at the Virginia conventi�n) with . 
i 
· a 
• 
remark� of George Mason and 
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
id. at 458-59 (James Madison's response). 
115. Those favoring a federal government with li  . d 
1808 clause and its implications for Cong , . I' d 
mite power were greatly concerned by the 
ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 454-56 (remar�
ess 
f 
1:_P 1; :owers under the :ommerce clause . See 3 J. 
ratifying convention). 
8 0 r. 0 n Tyler and Patnck Henry at the Virginia 
116. See 4 id. at 283 (remarks of Ch 1 C t . . ar es o esworth Pin k h S . . mg convention). c ney at t e outh Carolina ratify· 
117. Id. at 273 (remarks of Rawli·ns L d own es at the South c l ' · . . aro ma rat1fymg convent10n). 
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that " [w] ithout negroes, this state would degenerate into one of the 
most contemptible in the Union."118 But Maryland and Virginia already 
had prohibited the importation of slaves,119 and North Carolina had 
levied an importation tax.12° For each of these states a large percentage 
of slaves represented a domestic security risk.121 Moreover, Virginia was 
This belief on the part of South Carolinians originated many years prior. A colonist in 1682 wrote: 
a rational man will certainly inquire, when I have land, what shall I doe [sic] with it? What 
commoditys [sic] shall I be able to produce that will yield me the money in other countrys 
[sic] that I may be inabled [sic] to buy Negro slaves (without which a Planter can never do 
any great matter) and purchase other things for my pleasure and convenience, that Carolina 
doth not produce. 
A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 50, at 162-63 (emphasis in original) (quoting Wilson, An Account of 
the Province of Carolina, in NARRATIVES OF EARLY CAROLINA, 1650-1708, at 174 (A. Salley ed. 
191 1)). 
1 18. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 272 (remarks of Rawlins Lowndes). 
1 19. 1 Md. Laws ch. 23 (Kilty 1783);  see also Act 1 (1778), reprinted in 9 Va. Stats. at Large 
471 (Hening 1823); Act 33 (1780), reprinted in 10 id. at 307 (allowing relief for South Carolina and 
Georgia war refugees);  Act 77 ( 1785), reprinted in 12 id. at 182. 
120. 1 N.C. Acts of Assembly 413, 492 (Martin 1780). 
121. See Anderson, Rowley & Tollison, Rent Seeking and the Restriction of Human Ex­
change, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 87 n.10 ( 1988). Exact figures for the population in 1787 are unclear. 
See generally F. DEXTER, ESTIMATES OF POPULATION IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES (1887). According 
to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, the figures for the Southern States on which the Philadelphia 
convention based the initial apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives were as 
follows: 
State Population 
(thousands) 
Slaves 
(thousands) 
Slave % 
Maryland 250 80 32 
Virginia 532 280 53 
North Carolina 224 60 27 
South Carolina 182 80 44 
Georgia 98 20 20 
4 J.  ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 282. At the Virginia ratifying convention, Governor Randolph esti­
mated the population figures for Virginia differently, with 236,000 slaves and 352,000 whites. 3 id. 
at 73. Three years later, the first decennial census emerged with these presumably more accurate 
figures for the original Southern States: 
State 
Maryland 
Virginia 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Georgia 
Population 
(thousands) 
320 
748 
394 
249 
83 
Slaves 
(thousands) 
103 
293 
101 
107 
29 
Slave % 
32 
39 
2 6  
4 3  
35 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NEGRO POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
l790-1915, at 57 (1968); 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 29, 36, 32, 34, 26 (1975) [hereinafter 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS]. Regardless of the actual count, it is clear that Southerners thought that a 
large slave population represented vulnerability. Governor Randolph asked his colleagues at the 
ratifying convention: 
Are we not weakened by the population whom we hold in slavery? The day may come when 
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considered an exporter of slaves and thus would benefit from the cessa­
tion of slave imports. 122 
Thus delegates to conventions in the upper South complained that 
the new Constitution would continue for twenty years an " abominable 
traffic"12s and "nefarious trade,"12• which was "diabolical in  itself, and 
disgraceful to mankind."1211 Yet, these delegates also were concerned 
that the Constitution had not provided greater security for the South's 
interests in the slaves already present in the United States. 126 This con­
flict between concerns of morality and of self-interest was explained at 
the Virginia convention by George Mason: " [T]he continuation of this 
detestable trade adds daily to our weakness . . .  [Thus] [i]t is far from 
being a desirable property; but it will involve us in great difficulties and 
infelicity to be now deprived of them . . . .  and the loss of which would 
bring ruin on a great many people."127 
Delegates to the ratifying convention in South Carolina, a lower 
South State, had a more straightforward and internally consistent reac­
tion to the 1808 clause. Rawlins Lowndes noted the importance of 
slaves to the South Carolina economy and bitterly lamented the possi­
ble exclusion of slaves twenty years hence: " [B]ehold how our kind 
friends in the north were determined soon to tie up our hands, and 
drain us of what we had!"128 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney stated both 
his opposition to a prohibition on slave imports and his view on the 
importance of a continuing influx of slaves: 
I am of the same opinion now as I was two years ago, when I used the expressions 
the gentleman has quoted-that, while there remained one acre of swamp-land un­
c�eared of South Carolina, I would raise my voice against restricting the importa­
tion of n.egroes. I am as thoroughly convinced as that gentleman is, that the nature of our chma�e, and the flat, swampy situation of our country, obliges us to cultivate 
our lands with negroes, and that without them South Carolina would soon be a 
they may �ake an impression upon us. Gentlemen who have been long accustomed to the 
contemplation of the subject, think there is a cause of alarm in this case . . . . Our negroes 
are so nur_nerous, and are daily becoming so. When I reflect on their comparative number, and 
comparative condition, I am more persuaded of the great fitness of becoming more formidable 
than ever. 
3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 73, 192. Fear of slave rebellion plagued slaveholders i n  the United 
States from colonial times to the Civil War, see generally H. APTHEKER supra note 67 at 18-52, 
162-208· the m 1 · · 
' ' 
· ore s aves m a society, the more a society had to fear Cottrol & Diamond supra 
note 67, at 1110-12. 
· ' 
122. l W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 949. 
123· 4 �· ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 101 (remarks of James Galloway of North Carolina). 
124. 3 id. at 269 (remarks of George Mason). 
125. Id. at 452 (remarks of George Mason). 
G 11
126· See, e.g. , id. at 270, 452-53 (remarks of George Mason)· id at 101 (remarks of James a oway}. ' · 
127. 3 id. at 269-70. 
128. 4 id. at 273. 
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desert waste. '29 
Delegates to the ratifying conventions of the Northern States were 
equally straightforward, but, in opposition to the views emerging from 
the deep South, expressed their antipathy for the African slave trade. 
According to the Northern delegates, it was a "reproachful trade"130 
and a "wicked practice."131 Joshua Atherton of New Hampshire com­
plained that by accepting the 1808 clause "we become consenters to, 
and partakers in, the sin and guilt of this abominable traffic, at least 
for a certain period, without any positive stipulation that it should even 
be brought to an end."132 Yet, by approving the Constitution, Northern 
ratifying c onventions, like their counterparts in other states, approved 
the 1 808 clause. They did s o  based on an understanding that the 1808 
clause was the result of compromise. At the Philadelphia convention 
the delegates had been aware that for S outh C arolina and Georgia the 
importation of slaves was a question on which union might turn.133 Del­
egates from Connecticut were willing to accede to the Southern demand 
on this point, 13• and delegates from Massachusetts were conspicuously 
silent on the 1808 question. Others from the Northern and Mid-Atlan­
tic States opposed unlimited importation. They argued that importa­
tion of slaves not only added to the threat o f  slave insurrection,135 but 
129. Id. at 285. 
130. 2 id. at 452 (remarks of William Wilson of Pennsylvania). 
131. Id. at 149 (remarks of Isaac Backus of Massachusetts). 
132. Id. at 203 (emphasis in original). 
133. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 947 (remarks of Charles Pinckney); id. at 952 (re­
marks of Edmund Randolph). 
134. Id. at 948. Roger Sherman wanted "to have as few objections as possible to the proposed 
scheme of Government," and he thought it probable that the import trade would be outlawed by 
the states in due time. Id.; see also id. at 942, 952 (additional remarks by Sherman). Oliver Ells­
worth was more crass about the matter. Sherman at least had averred that he "regarded the slave 
trade as iniquitous," id. at 942, but Ellsworth declared, "Let every State import what it pleases. 
The morality or wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging to the States themselves. What 
enriches a part enriches the whole, and the States are the best judges of their particular interest." 
Id. at 946. William Johnson, the third member of Connecticut's delegation, did not speak on this 
subject, but during the prior debate on representation Johnson had been heard to support the 
South's initial position in favor of full representation for its slave population. Id. at 387. 
. 135. See id. at 941-42 (remarks of Rufus King); id. at 943 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris); id. at 946 (remarks of Luther Martin) .  Luther Martin later reported to the Maryland legislature on 
the Convention debate concerning the issue of slavery and domestic security: 
It was further urged that, by this system of government, every State is to be protected both 
from foreign invasion and from domestic insurrections; that, from this consideration, it was 
of the utmost importance it should have a power to restrain the importation of slaves; since 
in proportion as the number of slaves are increased in any State, in the same proportion the 
State is weakened, and exposed to foreign invasion or domestic insurrection, and by so much 
less will it be able to protect itself against either . . .  · 
3
. 
M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 212 (emphasis in original). Article IV, section � of the �onstitu­
tion provides that " [t]he United States . . .  shall protect each [state] . . .  agamst Invasion; and 
· 
· · against domestic Violence." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4. 
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also repudiated the ideology of the Revolution,136 indu�ed moral fai�­
ure, 137 and caused economic stagnation.138 The Convention faced a di­
lemma on the importation question: To risk either that "two States 
m ight be lost to the Union,'' or that strong antislavery elements in free 
states might be alienated.139 
Those who opposed and those who favored slave importation both 
thought that they had something to gain by the compromise embodied 
in the 1808 clause. Some of those who opposed the trade believed that a 
halt to the slave trade twenty years hence might "totally annihilate the 
slave trade"u0-that within the "lapse of a few years, . . . Congress will 
have power to exterminate slavery from within our borders. "141 This 
view resulted from a misreading of the 1808 clause: the clause did not 
establish the power of Congress to abolish slavery; the clause merely 
limited the exercise of congressional power to abolish the import trade 
in slaves. Nonetheless, the 1808 clause caused considerable optimism 
among Northerners who thought that "although slavery is not smitten 
by an apoplexy, yet it has received a mortal wound, and will die of a 
consumption."142 
Those Southerners in favor of the international slave trade knew 
better than to fear the death of slavery from a lack of foreign replace­
ments. For all the hyperbolic racket South Carolina's ratifying conven­
tion raised about the state's economy and its need for foreign sources of 
slaves, South Carolina's leaders had seen slavery survive quite well dur­
ing and after the Revolution,143 and they knew of Virginia's surplus of 
slaves. 144 For all their unhappiness with the 1808 clause, South Caro­
li na's leaders agreed to the clause and to the Constitution as a whole for 
the same simple reason as the states to the north: The compromises on 
the 1808 clause and the Constitution allowed the Union to continue, 
and with union there was strength. 
The deep South, however, had another reason for agreeing to post­
pone the day of reckoning on foreign slave trade until 1808. Delegates 
to the �eep South ratifying conventions, like those delegates at the 
Convention in Philadelphia, expected population to increase rapidly to· 
136. l W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 946 (remarks of Luther Martin). 
137 .  Id. at 948-49 (remarks of George Mason) .  
138 .  Id. at 948. 
1 39. Id. at 952 (remarks of Edward Randolph). 
l40. 2 ,J. ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 107 (remarks of General Thompson of Massachusetts). 1 4 L  Id. at 484 (remarks of William Wilson of Pennsylvania). North Carolina's James Gallo-wav g1m1larlv appr h d d th t th · 
· 
· · 
-. 
. 
e en e a e mtent1ons of compromisers who desired to halt the slave iJJI· port tr�de .;1thin twenty years might lead to the end of slavery altogether. See 4 id. at 101. 1 4 �. �. id. at 4 1  (remarks of Thomas Dawes of Massachusetts) .  1 4 .l. �t'f' P. FINKELMAN, supra note 61, at 25. 
I H. .'fr" 4 .J . ELLIOT, supra note 94, at 285 (remarks of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney) . 
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ward the South and Southwest. 1411 By preventing Congress from ban­
ning the foreign slave trade until 1808, the deep South had delayed a 
decision on the matter until a time when the deep South, together with 
its allies, might have the votes to forestall a prohibition altogether.146 
This possibility casts a sinister light on the agreement that pro­
duced the 1808 clause. Four days after the C onvention agreed to the 
twenty-year extension for foreign slave traffic, the South carried out its 
end of the bargain when the Convention decided the outcome of a pro­
posal that acts of Congress regulating commerce would require a two­
thirds majority. 147 This issue was perceived strictly as a sectional con­
flict, with the Northern States favoring a simple majority and the 
Southern States favoring the wider majority.148 Northern States wanted 
freedom to defend their commercial interests against foreign interfer­
ence. Southern States saw their interests in opposition to those of the 
North and wanted protection from the Northern majority that would 
exist for the short term in both houses of C ongress. The vote at the 
Convention went along geographic lines with one exception: Of the five 
Southern States, South Carolina voted with the seven Northern States 
in favor of a simple majority. 149 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney explained 
South Carolina's position as follows: It was in the "true interest o f  the 
S[outhern] States to have no regulation of commerce," but after consid­
ering the " liberal conduct" of the New England States toward the 
South C arolina position on freedom to import slaves, South Carolina 
felt that a simple majority vote on commercial regulation would 
suffice.160 
What did Pinckney mean by "liberal conduct?" The day before the 
final vote on the 1808 clause, the Convention had assigned the slave 
importation question to a committee in order t o  resolve the conflict be­
tween the forces that opposed slavery and importation, and the states 
145. Id. at 282 (remarks of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney). 
. 146. See W. Duso1s, supra note 61, at 70-73. The positions of the states respecting foreign importation of slaves did indeed change by 1808, but not in the direction South Carolina and 
Georgia might have hoped at the time of the Convention. The successful revolt of the slaves in 
Haiti in 1791 caused attitudes respecting slave importation to shift in the negative. Georgia for­
bade slave imports in 1798. South Carolina vacillated on the subject, alternately forbidding then 
allowing the slave import trade from 1788 until 1803, when slave traffic was opened on a perma­
nent basis pending the by then expected federal closure of the trade in 1808. North Carolina re­
pealed its prohibitory tax in 1790, but in 1794 forbade the importation of slaves outright. Id. 
147. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 449. 
148. See id. at 449-53. 
149. Id. at 453. 
150. Id. at 449-50; see also id. at 451 (remarks of another South Carolinian, Pierce Butler, 
who "considered the interests of [the Southern States] and of the Eastern States, to be as different 
as the interests of Russia and Turkey," but who supported the simple majority because he was 
"notwithstanding desirous of conciliating the affections of the East"). 
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of South Carolina and Georgia, who threatened secession. l l H  The com­
mittee returned the following day with a proposal that the slave trade's 
freedom from congressional limitation extend only to the year 1800.162 
Pinckney then moved to substitute the year 1808, and this motion was 
seconded by Nathanial Gorham of Massachusetts. us Despite the nota­
ble dissent of James Madison, a wealthy slaveholder himself who pro­
tested this further extension as " dishonorable to the American 
character,"154 the motion passed with the votes of Massac husetts, New 
Hampshire, and Connecticut deciding the issue in favor of the South 
Carolina proposal. 111� 
Thus, the New England States had traded their votes on a longer 
period of protected slave importation in exchange for South Carolina's 
vote on less restrictive commercial regulation.1116 This compromise is 
omitted from the popular histories of the Constitutional  Convention, 
for it was an underhanded, "sleazy compromise,"1117 reeking of self-in­
terest and cynicism. The self-interest involved was not merely the self­
evident concerns of Southern slaveholders, but also the more subtle 
concerns of New England shipping interests, who stood to gain from 
prolonged slave commerce with the South us and desire d  to regulate 
151. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 952. 
152. Id. at 953-54. 
153. Id. at 954. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 449. Madison's notes on the Philadelphia conven· 
ti on belie any accusation of faulty inference. He reported: "An understanding on the two subjects 
of navigation and slavery, had taken place between those two parts of the Union, which explains 
the vote on the Motion depending, as well as the language of Genl, Pinckney and others." Id. 
Moreover, in his report to the Maryland legislature, Luther Martin recounted the proceedings 
within t.he committee that formulated for the Convention the original compromise on the issue of 
slave imports: 
This committee, of which I had the honor to be a member, met and took under their consider­
a�ion the subjects committed to them. I found the eastern States, notwithstanding their aver­
sion to slavery, were very willing to indulge the southern States at least with a temporary 
liberty to prosecute the s lave-trade, provided the southern States �ould, in their turn, gratify 
them, by laying no restriction on navigation acts; and after a very little time the committee, 
by a great majority, agreed on a report, by which the general government was to be prohibited 
from preventing the importation of slaves for a limited time and the restrictive clause rela-
tive to navigation acts was to be omitted. 
' 
3 id. at 210-11 (emphasis in original). 
157. Id.; see P. Finkelman, Legal History and Constitutional Developments Post 1800, Re· 
marks at :he American Association of Law Librarians 80th Annual Meeting (July 7, 1987) (audi· 
otape ava'.lable through Mobiltape Company, Inc.). The term "sleazy compromise" is attributable 
to Paul Fmkelman, who has used it to describe the New England-South Carolina agreement. 
158. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 949. During the debate on the 1808 clause, George 
Maso
.
n recogniz�? "that some of our Eastern brethren had from a lust of gain embarked on this 
nefa
.
nous traffic. Id. �harles �?tesworth Pinckney appealed directly to the profit motive when h� 
remmded the Convention that [t]he more slaves, the more produce to employ the carrying trade. 
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commerce on the basis of a simple consensus, without the difficulty of 
seeking a supermajority. 1G9 
C. The Fugitive Slave Clause and Taxation 
The Constitution's third direct regulation of slavery is found in the 
fugitive slave clause, article IV, section 2, clause 3: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping 
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be dis­
charged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the 
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due. 160 
The clause was based on article VI of the Northwest Ordinance, which 
had forbidden slavery in the Northwest Territory, but concomitantly 
had provided for the return of fugitive slaves from the territory. 161 Be­
cause the fugitive slave clause aroused virtually no debate at the Con­
stitutional Convention, little can be divined about the Framers' 
intent. 162 The fugitive slave clause was neither a major nor even a sig­
nificant issue at the Constitutional Convention. 
Of greater importanc e  at the Convention was the issue of taxation, 
a matter on which the Southern States held views different from, but 
compatible with, their Northern sisters. The Convention emerged with 
provisions that limited the taxing authority of both the federal and 
Id. at 950. Some have argued that at this time New England shipping interests dealt little with 
slave imports. See 2 W. WEEDEN, ECONOMIC AND SocrAL HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND, 1620-1789, at 
834-36 ( 1 890). Such commerce was at least a subject of social approbation and legal interdiction. 
Id.; see also W. DuBois, supra note 6 1 ,  at 29-38, 48-50. Yet, laws prohibiting participation in the 
slave trade were difficult to enforce, and smuggling was considered "flagrant and widespread." D. 
ROBINSON, supra note 73, at 318. 
159. See generally 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 449-53. This desire was in New England's 
interest only in the short term if sectional conflict was as real as the Convention perceived and if 
the Convention's expectations for population growth were realized; for soon the Southern States, 
whose interests were contrary to those of the North, would predominate in the House of Repre­
sentatives. On the other hand, for this reason the simple majority represented a long-term benefit 
to the South. 
160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
161. 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 81, at 39, 49. 
162. The entire debate over the clause takes up less than two full pages of Farrand's Records 
of the Federal Convention of 1 787. Late in the Convention Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckney 
introduced a proposition "to require fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals." 
2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 443. This proposal was too much even for the jaded sensibilities of 
Connecticut's Roger Sherman, who had supported the deep South in its demand for a complete 
prohibition on congressional power to ban slave imports. See supra note 134 and accompanying 
text. Sherman declared that he saw "no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a 
slave or servant, than a horse." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 443. Butler then withdrew the 
Proposal, id., but returned the following day with a more gingerly worded proposal that passed 
without objection. Id. at 453-54. The Convention's committee of style revised the clause yet an­
other time,  id. at 601-02 and so did the Convention as a whole, in deference to some who objected 
that the committee's ve;sion had "favor[ed] the idea that slavery was legal in a moral view. " Id. at 
628. 
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state governments. Article I, section 9, clause 5 provided simply: "No 
Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. "163 Arti­
cle I, section 10, clause 2 provided a similar prohibition against imposi­
tions of corresponding state taxes. 164 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney had 
warned that South Carolina's agreement to the Constitution would be 
in jeopardy if the Convention did not agree to protect against the taxa­
tion of exports. 1611 Other Southern delegates echoed Pinckney's con­
cerns.166 These delegates were concerned that taxation of exports might 
be an instrument of sectional conflict and that, by taxing exports pro­
duced by the Southern States' slaves, the new government could in ef­
fect tax slavery.167 
Northern delegates who disfavored the power of taxation over ex­
ports feared federal discrimination against certain states and potential 
damage to the interests of particular states. These delegates saw an op­
portunity for consuming states to free themselves from unwelcome 
taxes placed on goods by producer states168 and banded with the South 
to pass the two prohibitions.169 Thus, the South's interest in protecting 
slavery again was accommodated by Northern States who wished to sat­
isfy their own selfish interests. 
With the agreements that limited the power of Congress to disad­
vantage Southern interests in slavery, and especially with the compro­
mise over representation embodied in the three-fifths clause, the South 
had achieved through hard bargaining and joint effort a structural ad-
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
164. Article I, § 10, clause 2 declares: 
No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or 
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the 
net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for 
the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revi­
sion and Controul of the Congress. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
165. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 69, at 95. 
166. See 1 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 973. George Mason hoped that "the Northern States 
did not mean to deny the Southern this security." Id. North Carolina's Hugh Williamson and John 
Francis Mercer, along with Daniel Carroll of Maryland, also spoke against export taxes. Id. at 974-
76. Pierce Butler declared "that he would never agree to the power of taxing exports." Id. at 984. 
Southern delegates were nearly unanimous on the tax issue. Compare, however, the remarks of 
James Madison, who wholeheartedly favored the power to levy taxes on exports. Id. at 974, 980-81. 
Among Southe�n delegates, only George Washington joined Madison in this position. Id. at 982. 
. 167. See 1�· at 981-82 (remarks of George Mason); id. at 958 (remarks of Charles Cotesworth 
;.m
.
ckney). Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts shared the view that the taxing power over expor� 
might be made use of to compel the States to comply with the will of the General Government. 
Id. at 981. 
168. See generally id. at 975-82. 
l69. Id. at 982. The five Southern States voted with Massachusetts and Connecticut to adopt 
the f�deral ?rohibition. Id. Only Massachusetts and Maryland voted against prohibition on state 
taxation of imports. Id. at 1086. 
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vantage in the composition and powers of the legislative branch of the 
federal government. Moreover, the three-fifths clause gave the South an 
additional bonus. Not only was the South's interest in slaves to be 
counted in determining the distribution of power in the legislative 
branch, but the same formula would be used in determining the weight 
of Southern votes in the election of the chief of the executive branch, 
the President. 
D. Election of the President 
The Constitution did not provide for direct election of the Presi­
dent by the populace, but instead for indirect election by a college of 
electors appointed from each state. The number of electors would be 
determined based on the number of senators and representatives to 
which the state was entitled in Congress.170 Thus, just as the three­
fifths clause granted the South additional representation in Congress, 
the clause also added to Southern influence in the selection of the 
President. 
This convoluted method of selecting a President was the product of 
compromise between those who favored popular election and those who 
favored appointment by the Congress.171 Roger Sherman of Connecticut 
and James Wilson of Pennsylvania championed the two opposing posi­
tions. Sherman was "for the appointment by the Legislature, and for 
making [the President] absolutely dependent on that body"; an inde­
pendent executive, Sherman believed, was the essence of "tyranny."172 
Wilson was "for an election by the people;" experience, Wilson be­
lieved, had shown "that an election of the first magistrate by the people 
at large, was both a convenient and successful mode."173 
Both positions had their detractors at the C onvention. Pennsylva­
nia's Gouverneur Morris proposed that a President appointed by C on-
170. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1,  2. The provisions state: 
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall 
· · . be elected, as follows 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Num­
ber of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the 
State may be entitled in the Congress. 
Id. 
171. These were not the only methods of selection considered by the Convention. The Con­
vention overwhelmingly rejected Elbridge Gerry's motion that the President be elected by the 
equal votes of the states' governors. 2 W. BENTON, supra note 68, at 1 117-18. New York's Alexan­
der Hamilton, arguing that "no good [executive] could be established on Republican principles, "  
id. at 1121, proposed an executive with life tenure, to be elected by electors chosen from election 
districts into which the states would be divided. Id. at 1123-24. Hamilton's proposal was never 
reduced to a motion, nor was it voted on by the Convention. 
172. Id. at 1101. 
173. Id. 
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gress would be "the mere creatur e  of the Legislature. . . .  [the 
President] ought to be elected by the people at large, by the freeholders 
of the Country."174 Madison agreed with the need for an independent 
executive branch and thought it "essential . . . that the appointment of 
the Executive should either be drawn from some source, or held by 
some tenure, that will give him a free agency with regard to the Legisla­
ture. "17� James Wilson added his b elief that " [t]he appointment to 
great offices" should not be left to the legislature, for this process was 
"the most corruptly managed of any that had been committed to legis­
lative bodies.m76 
Pierce Butler of South Carolina argued, however, that popular elec­
tion would be "so complex and unwieldy so as to disgust the States."177 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts also was opposed to a popular elec­
tion. He believed that the people were "uninformed, and would be mis­
led by a few designing men."178 Virginia's George Mason similarly 
believed that popular election simply was not practicable. He main· 
tained that 
it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief Magis· 
trate to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man. The 
extent of the Country renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite 
capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the Candidates. 1 7 9  
Thus, delegates from both North and South were divided about the 
merits of popular election versus legislative appointment of the Presi­
dent. Although much of the Convention debate on this issue repre· 
sented an honest quest for a selection method that favored good 
government, 180 sectional issues continued to influence the discussions. 
Virginia's Governor Randolph alluded to these sectional i ssues when he 
s�oke in favor of a tripartite executive, " to be drawn from different por· 
tion� of the Country."181 North Carolina's Hugh Williamson stressed 
the mherent danger of a sole executive with veto power and argued that 
the "essential difference of interests between the Northern and South· 
em States" required a tripartite executive.182 
. . 174· Id. at 1126. Moreover, Morris warned, "If the Legislature elect, it will be the work of 
mtngue,
. 
of �abal, and of faction; it will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals; 
real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment." Id. 
175. Id. at 1 136. 
176. Id. at 1128. 
177·
. 
Id. at 1151. Nor was Butler enamored of election by the Congress· "The two great evils � be 
_
avmded are cabal at home, and influence from abroad. It will be difficul� to avoid either if the ect10n be made by the National Legislature." Id. 
178. Id. at 1 137. 
179. Id. at 1 128. 
180. See generally id. at 1094-1184. 
181. Id. at 1112; see also id. at 1104. 
182. Id. at 1 143 Williamson h d th . · a o er reasons for desuing a three-headed executive: 
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Sectional issues bore directly upon Southern opposition to popular 
election. Many Southern d elegates opposed popular election because 
they feared that " [t] he most populous States by combining in favor of 
the same individual will be able to carry their points."183 This fear was 
not inconsistent with the Convention's expectation that population 
movement would favor the Southern States. Regardless of the relative 
degrees of population growth, a significant portion of the Southern pop­
ulation would be slaves who, as the Convention delegates recognized, 
would "have no suffrage, "184 and therefore no voice in a popular 
election. 
Madison spoke directly to the problem and to its solution. 
Whatever the relative merit of popular election,1811 Madison stated that 
"[t]here was one difficulty . . .  of a serious nature attending an immedi­
ate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more diffusive 
in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no 
influence in the election on the score of Negroes."186 While population 
movement and the passage of more liberal access to the ballot might 
ameliorate the South's disadvantage, popular election of the President 
would, nonetheless, require the sacrifice of S outhern interests. 187 The 
answer as Madison saw it was the "substitution of electors[ ,  which] ob­
viated this difficulty and seemed on the whole liable to fewest 
objections. "188 
In the end, popular election was voted down by the Convention1 89 
in favor of election by joint ballot of the C ongress.190 Madison pro­
nounced this solution "not . . . unreasonable," even though it increased 
the power of small states. 191 While small states received an advantage 
Another objection against a single Magistrate is that he will be an elective King, and will feel 
the spirit of one. He will spare no pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay a train for 
the succession of his children. It was pretty certain he thought that we should at some time or 
other have a King; but he wished n o  precaution to be omitted that might postpone the event 
as long as possible. 
Id. 
183. Id. at 1 1 27 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). 
184. Id. at 1128 (remarks of Hugh Williamson). 
185. Id. at 1136-37. Madison stated: 
The people at large were . . .  the fittest [source for appointment]. It would be as likely as any 
that could be devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character. The 
people generally could only know and vote for some Citizen whose merits had rendered him 
as object of general attention and esteem. 
Id. at 1 137. All tolled, "[w]ith all its imperfections he liked this best." Id. at 1150. 
186. Id. at 1 137; see also id. at 1150. 
187. Id. at 1150. 
188. Id. at 1 137. 
189. Id. at 1159-60. 
190. Id. at 1 155, 1160. 
191. Id. at 1160. 
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by adding in the ballot for President an equal �umber of Senate votes 
to the House votes proportioned to the populat10n, the South, as a re­
gion, gained more. The j oint ballot compromise meant that the South 
had stretched its slave representation advantage beyond one-half of the 
legislative branch into the entire power to elect the President. When 
the Convention approved the proposal of an electoral college appor­
tioned in the same manner as the state delegations to Congress,192 
Northern interests once again had combine d  with Southern desires to 
achieve the maximum protection for Southern interests in slavery by 
giving political advantage to the South. 
Significantly, the President retained the power to control the per­
sonnel of the third branch of government, the judiciary. Vested in the 
President was the duty, "by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, [to] appoint . . .  Judges of the [S] upreme Court."193 By exten­
sion, therefore, the South's influence over the election of the Chief Ex­
ecutive would result in increased Southern influence over the judicial 
branch, especially over the Supreme Court, whose opinions on matters 
of federal law would be supreme. In a case before the Supreme Court 
regarding slavery, the South reasonably might hope that Southe rn Pres­
idents or Presidents beholden to the South might have appointed 
Southern judges or judges otherwise friendly to Southern interests. The 
South also might hope that if its anticipated power in Congress ever 
failed, or if its influence over the office of the P resident had diminished, 
that the South's influence over the Supreme Court, developed during 
prior years of influence over the other branches, might help to maintain 
slavery. 
Eventually, the Nation rid itself of the cancer of slavery in spite of 
the Framers of the Constitution, who actively protected Southern inter­
ests in slavery by their adoption of the 1808 clause, the fugitive slave 
clause, and the export tax clauses, and who intended to protect slavery 
passively through the three-fifths clause. Moreover the Framer s  of the 
Constitution delivered to the white South an influe�ce beyond its num­
bers over the executive branch and, by extension, over the Supreme 
Court. Regardless of the ultimate fate of slavery in the United States, 
the. Framers of the Constitution stand condemned by their intent to deliver to the South the means of the federal government to maintain slavery so long as the South desired to maintain it. Only develo pments unf�reseen by the Framers forestalled perpetual control over the slav­ery issue by the Southern States, who had political incentives-created by the Constitution itself-to maintain slavery. 
192. Id. at 1 165-66, 1 179. 
1 93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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IV. THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME: CALCULATION OR MISCALCULATION? 
Beyond any doubt, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
created a document rife with compromise over the issue of slavery. It 
may be, as Assistant Attorney General Reynolds has argued, that these 
compromises resolved for the Northern delegates a Robson's choice of 
either acquiescing to the protection of slavery or forgoing union.194 That 
this choice existed does not detract from Justice Marshall's criticism of 
the Constitution as a document flawed by a failure of "wisdom, fore­
sight, and sense of justice. "1911 For the Framers did not simply trade a 
limited protection of slavery in order to ensure union; instead they de­
livered to the white South advantages in the very structure of the new 
government intended to give the South veto power over federal regula­
tion of slavery. In effect, the Framers delivered to the South the power 
to maintain slavery as lon g  as it chose, regardless of antislavery senti­
ment in the North. Thus, the Framers built the system of individual 
liberty that characterizes this Nation and the structure that protects it 
on a foundation not of freedom, but of slavery. That this foundation 
would be rebuilt into one based on freedom was not inevitable, for the 
Framers intended that the S outh, at whose insistence the slavery com­
promise s  were accomplished, would control the federal levers of change. 
If J ustice Marshall's criticism of the Constitution and its Framers 
has borne the need to explore the Convention and the ratification de­
bates, his criticism also raises questions about what happened after the 
ratification of the Constitution. The Framers' expectations of popula­
tion growth, and thus of power in Congress, were not met. Population 
did not grow toward the S outh and Southwest, but instead toward the 
North and Northwest.196 Thus, unanticipated population trends raise 
further questions, not of the intent but of the effect of the Constitution 
on the conduct of slavery in the Nation. If the South did not obtain a 
majority in the House of Representatives, 197 then what advantage did it 
obtain? In the House, did votes attributable to the South's slave popu­
lation affect or even change the course of national policy? Were P resi­
dents elected by slave votes?198 Was Southern influence over the federal 
government, magnified by its slave population, responsible for Southern 
dominance of the Supreme Court?199 If, as Justice Marshall has argued, 
194. Another View, supra note 35, at 1347. 
195. Marshall, supra note 2, at 1 338. 
196. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 121, at 22. 
197. See 2 id. at 1085. 
198. Of the fourteen men elected President before the Civil War, seven were Southerners. 
Southern Presidents governed the Nation for forty-one of the seventy-one years of constitutional 
government through 1860. 1988 WORLD ALMANAC AND BooK OF FACTS 320-22. 
199. Only from 1796 to 1798 and from 1829 to 1837 did the full complement of the Supreme 
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the Framers' compromises on slavery render suspect their sense of wis­
dom, foresight, and justice, then answers to these questions can tell 
much about the degree to which the Framers lacked these qualities. 
Answers to these questions also can tell us whether the Framers' 
failure of wisdom, foresight, and justice, and their sacrifice o f  political 
morality for political expedience embodied merely constitutional im­
pediments to change, or served primarily as a model for later govern­
mental action respecting slavery. Indications that the Framers' moral 
compromise represented a model for future governmental action sur­
faced in an event that took place in 1861,  after the secession of the 
Southern States had begun200 and as the Na ti on stood on the brink of a 
great military conflict that would either maintain or dissolve the Union. 
On March 2, 1861, two days before Abraham Lincoln took office as 
President, Congress passed a joint resolution to amend the C onstitution 
to include a thirteenth amendment: 
No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to 
Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic 
institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of 
said State. 201 
Congress had not passed this resolution in a vacuum. Lincoln had 
won the 1860 Presidential election without the benefit o f  a single 
Southern or border state.202 The platform of Lincoln's Republican 
Party had advocated no further geographic extension of slavery, even 
though the platform promised no interference with slavery's existence 
within the slave states themselves.203 Nonetheless, within three months 
of Lincoln's November victory, seven states had seceded.204 The need 
for a compromise to save the Union was apparent.2011 
Court contain a majority of non-Southern Justices. H. ABRAHAM, JusTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A Po­
LITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 7 1 - 115, 384-87 (2d ed. 1 985). 
200. 2 A. NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF LINCOLN 318-62 ( 1950). 
201. J. RES. 13, 12 Stat. 251 (1861). 
202. 2 A. NEVINS, supra note 200, at 312-13; see also C ONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO 
U.S. ELECTIONS 232 (1975). 
203. See K. PORTER & D. JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1960, at 3 1 -32 (2d ed. 
1961). The 1860 Republican party platform promised to slave states that the maintenance of each 
state's right to "control its own domestic institutions . . .  is essential to _ . .  the perfection and 
endurance of our political fabric," but declared as "dangerous political heresy" the holding of 
Scott v . . Sand{ ord, which had declared unconstitutional congressional legislation banning slavery fror:1 U?ited �tates territories. Id. Moreover, the platform "den[ied] the authority of Congress, of a 
ter�itonal legis
,
l,ature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of th
e 
United States. Id.; see also E. FONER, supra note 89, at 261-317. 
204. 2 A. NEVINS, supra note 200, at 318-28; see also 3 J. RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 159 (1928) . 
. 205. "Co�promise" in the context of the slavery issue meant capitulation. The history of sectional conflict before the Civil War is the history of Southern demands for extension of slave 
territory and of limits on the federal government's ability to affect that extension. It is also the 
1989] PRO-SLAVER Y CONSTITUTION 129 
Attention was focused on the proposals of Kentucky Senator John 
Crittendon. Crittendon had proposed a series of constitutional amend­
ments dealing extensively with Southern concerns over slavery. These 
amendments included: (1) the extension of the Missouri Compromise 
line to California, prohibiting slavery above the line but protecting slav­
ery below it; (2) a prohibition on the abolition of slavery in any federal 
enclave inside a slave state, including the District of Columbia so long 
as Virginia or Maryland maintained slaves; (3) a limitation on federal 
interference with interstate transportation of slaves and a toughening of 
the federal position on fugitive slaves; and (4) a prohibition on constitu­
tional amendments tampering with slavery.208 Lincoln, however, steered 
his party away from acceptance of Crittendon's compromise proposal.207 
All the proposed amendments were rejected except the last, which 
formed the basis for what originally was proposed as the thirteenth 
amendment.208 The entire Crittendon proposal was more like Northern 
surrender to the slave states rather than compromise; but the proposed 
thirteenth amendment provided the opportunity, if the South would 
have accepted it, to maintain the Union, though at the cost of affirming 
what the Constitution of 1787 had only implied-that slavery would 
continue in the United States so long as the Southern States desired. 
Lincoln implicitly approved of the proposed amendment in his in­
augural address when he repeated a pledge from an earlier speech: "I 
have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution 
of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right 
to do so, and I have no inclination to do so."209 Thus, in 1861, a Presi­
dent unbeholden to the South for his election and a Congress from 
which many Southern members had resigned offered the South the 
same contract that the Northern delegates to the Constitutional Con­
vention had sealed with their Southern brethren: Continued union in 
exchange for continued slavery. Only the South's intransigence led to 
the refusal of the new deal, the subsequent Civil War, and the end of 
slavery. 
The story of the proposed thirteenth amendment tells less about 
history of Northern surrender to the demands. See generally W. COOPER, THE SOUTH AND THE 
POLITICS OF SLAVERY, 1828-1856 (1978); A. CRAVEN, THE GROWTH OF SOUTHERN NATIONALISM, 1848-
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206. S.J. RES. 50, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. (1860), reprinted in E. McPHERSON, THE POLITICAL 
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209. 6 J. NICOLAY & J. HAY, COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 170 (1894). 
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the influence of slave representation in Co�gress. than it tel.ls. about 
slavery's influence on politics during the ?�r�od prior to the C ivil W, ar. 
The story confirms Justice Marshall's cnticism of the 1787 Constitu­
tion: That the document as written originally was flawed, perhaps fa­
tally, by compromises with racism and slavery. The story of the 
proposed thirteenth amendment, however,  goes beyo.nd the �ars�all 
thesis by suggesting that this Nation's fundamental mterest m umon 
outweighed its interest in liberty and equality, not merely at the time of 
the Constitutional Convention but even beyond. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The implications of Justice Marshall's thesis are simple and power­
ful. First, under the slavery compromises at the Constitutional Conven­
tion, an extra measure of political power was delivered to the South 
based on its slave population. The Framers intended that this political 
power would allow the South to protect and defend its interest in slav­
ery. Second, this power constituted an incentive for the South to main­
tain slavery, for the maintenance of slavery protected Southern political 
power. If these implications are correct, then Justice Marshall's critics 
simply were incorrect in asserting that the Framers left open the possi­
bility of eliminating slavery through constitutional amendment. Fur­
ther, if the implications of Justice Marshall's thesis are correct, the 
beauty of the Constitution, as his critics described it, is irrelevant to the 
discussion of slavery; for the Framers left closed the possibility that the 
constitutional structure would ever liberate slaves without the active 
agreement and participation in the amending process by those states 
that had a political interest in maintaining slavery. 
The Framers chose to sell the soul of the Nation-the promise of 
the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal"-in 
exchange for the life of the Nation as a u nified whole. Perhaps, how­
ever, as indicated by the story of the thirteenth amendment as it might 
have been, the Framers should not be singled out for their political sur­
render to the evil of slavery. Justice Marshall's thesis can be tested by 
empirical data that can confirm or deny the thesis's accuracy. These 
data also can determine whether those who followed the Framers as 
decisionmakers also merit criticism on the issue of slavery and union. !hese data exist in decennial census counts related to apportionment; 
m the votes of Congress and congressional committees on issues related 
to slavery, such as territorial expansion, fugitive slaves, tariffs, and the 
enforceme�t of regulations forbidding foreign imports of slaves after 1808; and m the records of Presidential elections. 
Rese�rch into these data may reveal just how much the Congresses and Presidents that followed the framing of the Constitution were 
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bound by the South's extra votes in the House of Representatives and 
in the electoral college, and h ow much they were bound instead by lack 
of desire and failure of will. This research also may reveal whether Jus­
tice Marshall was correct to criticize the Framers for selling the Na­
tion's soul, or whether instead his criticism should have been that the 
Nation's soul simply was incapable of salvation. 
